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COMPULSORY CONTRACEPTION AS A CONDITION
OF PROBATION: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
NORPLANT
INTRODUCTION
On December 2, 1990 Tulare County Superior Court Judge
Howard Broadman convicted Darlene Johnson of three counts of
child abuse in violation of California Penal Code section 273(d).1
At the time of her conviction, Ms. Johnson had four children
and was pregnant with a fifth. The court granted her petition
for a suspended sentence on January 2, 1991 and placed her on
' Text of Judgment Proceedings, People v. Darlene Johnson, No. 29390 (Jan. 2,
1991).
The Johnson case gained instant notoriety and continues to be controversial. Within
days of Judge Broadman's decision dozens of articles and letters appeared in various
newspapers around the country and continued to appear throughout the month. See,
e.g., Rachel Pine, Don't Force Birth Control on Women, USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 1991, at SA;
Judge Orders Birth Control for Abusive Mother, LA. T"ms, Jan. 30, 1991, at 6B; Albert
Kaupas, An Eye for an Eye, CHL TPm., Feb. 12, 1991, at 14; The Norplant Sentence,
WAsH. PosT, Jan. 24, 1991, at A20. A great deal of the writing was critical, as women's
and civil liberties' groups decried this "totalitarian" measure. Mary Cantwell, Coercion
and Contraception, N. Y. Tihms, Jan. 27, 1991, § 4, at 16. Another extreme critic of
Darlene Johnson's probation condition was Harry Brodine, an anti-abortion activist.
Brodine attempted to shoot Judge Broadman in court several weeks later to protest the
judge's order. Following his surrender Brodine was heard to mutter "Norplant kills ba-
bies." Bill Ainsworth, Tulare's Target of Controversy, THE RcRDMA, Mar. 28, 1991, at
1. The Johnson case continued to be written about and discussed while the appeal VM
pending in the California Court of Appeals. Both national network news and 60 Minutes
addressed the topic. See 60 Minutes: Norplant (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 10, 1991)
(hereinafter 60 Minutes). It even reached the popular audience, airing as a feature on
L.A. Law on November 14, 1991. Darlene Johnson's case was rendered moot in March,
1992 when she was sentenced to prison for violating another condition of probation.
Birth Curb Order is Declared Moot, N.Y. Tiaras, Apr. 15, 1992, at A23. In fact, a recent
California Court of Appeals decision indicates that the condition imposed on Darlene
Johnson would have been held unconstitutional had it too reached the court of appeals.
People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263 (Ct. App. 1992) (invalidating a probation condi-
tion, also imposed by Judge Broadman, forbidding defendant from becoming pregnant).
The continuing battle over fetal rights and reproductive freedom, however, indicates that
the issue of compulsory contraception is far from being resolved.
Michael Lev, Judge is Firm on Forced Contraception, but Welcomes an Appeal,
N.Y. Tihms, Jan. 11, 1991, at A17. Johnson was convicted of striking her five- and six-
year-old daughters. There was no charge that she had hit her other children, nor had she
ever before been convicted of child abuse.
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probation for a term of three years.3 Among the conditions of
her probation were that Ms. Johnson serve a jail term of one
year, that she not discipline her children by striking them, that
she undergo parental counseling and that she be implanted with
the contraceptive device Norplant for the entire period of her
probation.4 Norplant was a new drug approved by the United
States Food, and Drug Administration ("FDA") less than a
month before Ms. Johnson's probation was to begin.5 Under
these terms, Ms. Johnson would have become the first woman
ever to be implanted with Norplant by court order.
A prescription drug developed in the United States, Nor-
plant consists of six silicon tubes containing the synthetic hor-
mone levonorgestill. The tubes are surgically implanted under
the skin of a woman's arm and prevent conception for up to five
years, or until removed by a doctor.' Norplant is highly effective,
requires no care or effort on the part of the woman and can be
removed only by a licensed practitioner. Developers of the drug
also claim that it does not cause many of the same side effects as
other contraceptive devices, such as the birth control pill or the
intrauterine device ("IUD").8 Norplant can, however, cause ir-
regular menstrual periods, nausea, acne and hair lossY It can
also endanger women with conditions such as diabetes, depres-
sion or high cholesterol. 10 While the medical community is aware
of Norplant's short-term dangers, little is known about its long-
term effects.
Although the use of Norplant may be novel, the concept of
"compulsory contraception" as a condition of probation for
women convicted of child abuse and other crimes is not new."
aId.
4 Judgment Proceedings, supra note 1, at 2. Johnson was also ordered to abstain
from the use of alcohol, tobacco or drugs during her pregnancy. She did not challenge
these conditions on appeal.
Lev, supra note 1, at A17.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 4-5, People v. Johnson (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1991) (No.
29390) [hereinafter Appellant's Opening Brief].
Id.
Id. at 5 (citing R. Hatcher, et. a], Implants, Injections & Other Progestin-only
Contraceptives, in CONTRACEPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 303 (1988)).
' Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 6.
10 Id. at 5-6.
1 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 1979) (invalidating
a condition prohibiting pregnancy and marriage); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335
(Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (invalidating a condition prohibiting pregnancy during five-year
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Indeed, throughout the history of the United States, some social
theorists have argued that many social ills are the result of ge-
netic defects and can best be addressed by "prevent[ing] the
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind."12 Over time, many
lower courts have been receptive to the idea of ordering steriliza-
tion, temporary or otherwise, as a condition of probation or a
term for plea bargaining. However, no court has ever upheld on
appeal compulsory contraception as a condition of probation. 3
probation period); People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (CL App. 1967) (invalidating a
condition prohibiting pregnancy for woman convicted of robbery). Compulsory contra-
ception has also been used as a condition of probation for men convicted of crimes. See
State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410 (S.C. 1985) (invalidating an order of castration for de-
fendants convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct); Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d
918 (FIa. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (invalidating a probation condition prohibiting a man con-
victed of child abuse from fathering a child).
In a recent case, which has not yet been appealed, a Tennessee judge agreed to pro-
bation for a husband and wife convicted of child molestation on the condition that the
woman be sterilized permanently. Critics of the order argue that the condition violated
not only constitutional rights of procreation and privacy, but also of equal protection,
since the judge's order did not require the man to be sterilized as well. Woman Who
Molested Sons Agrees to Sterilization, N.Y. Tutw, Jan. 31, 1993, at A29.
For further information on court-ordered sterilization, temporary or permanent, see
Colleen M. Coyle, Sterilization: A "Remedy for the Malady" of Child Abuse?, 5 J. CoN-
TEMP. HEALTH L & POL'y 245 (1989). See also Susan Stefan, Whose Egg is it Anyway?:
Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated, Institutionalized and Incompetent Women, 13
NOVA LJ. 405 (1989).
12 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). For a brief description of the American Eugen-
ics movement, see infra notes 143-154 and accompanying text.
13 See People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding invalid and
unconstitutional a probation condition ordering woman to refrain from becoming preg-
nant); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. App. 1989) (same); Thomas v. State, 519
So.2d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (striking condition prohibiting defendant from be-
coming pregnant while unmarried); State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1986)
(striking condition prohibiting defendant from becoming pregnant unless married);
Smith v. Superior Court, 726 P.2d 1101 (Ariz. 1986) (striking sterilization as a condition
of reduced sentence for child abuser); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App.
1984) (striking condition prohibiting defendant from becoming pregnant); Howland v.
State, 420 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding invalid probation condition
forbidding child abuser from "fathering" any children); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (same); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335'(Ohio Ct. App.
1976) (same); People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1967) (striking condition
prohibiting defendant from becoming pregnant); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.
Iowa), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1914) (invalidating a state statute requiring
all criminals convicted twice of felonies to have vasectomies performed). A later decision,
People v. Blankenship, 161 Cal.2d. 606 (1936), in which a man convicted of statutory
rape was given a suspended sentence on the condition that be submit to sterilization, was
overruled by subsequent cases. See also South Carolina v. Williams, Indictment No. 86-
187, July 7, 1986.
A number of state laws continue to allow for compulsory sterilization of criminals or
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From the early part of the century to the present day, courts
have thought little of ordering permanent forms of sterilization,
such as tubal ligations, performed on women convicted of
crimes, or seen as generally "unfit.114 As time progressed, courts
began to offer compulsory contraception as an alternative to in-
carceration, but did not specify the form of birth control to be
used. Rather, these courts let the woman decide among various
existing devices, such as the pill, the IUD or the diaphragm. The
understanding existed, however, as it did with all terms of pro-
bation, that failure to obey those terms, i.e., getting pregnant,
would lead to a prison sentence.15 These alternative methods are
not completely effective and require care and responsibility on
the part of the woman. Norplant, on the other hand, presents to
the courts an unprecedented means of enforcing temporary birth
control as a condition of probation. Given its uncertain effect on
women's health"6 and its potential use as a tool for social engi-
neering,17 it also raises the specter of great judicial abuse.
Some commentators have discounted the threat of Norplant
and other evolving reproductive technologies being used for
eugenics purposes.1 " Since the approval of Norplant by the FDA,
however, a number of controversial measures have been pro-
posed which can only add to the fear that Norplant will be used
to restrict reproduction by those deemed "unfit." The Governor
of Maryland recently announced a plan to offer free Norplant to
the mentally incompetent. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-45-1 (Supp. 1987); N.C. CEN.
STAT. § 35-36 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 27-16-1 (1986).
14 Statutes allowing for compulsory sterilization, see supra note 13, have been ap-
plied exclusively to the mentally incompetent. Courts have justified this use, however,
not on the traditional rationale of parens patriae (the state's responsibility toward
juveniles and the insane), but rather on the individual's "best interests." See In re
Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 481 n.8 (N.J. 1981); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 640
(Wash. 1980).
15 See NE. P. COHEN & JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
(1987).
l See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 23-26, 143-154 and accompanying text. The developers of Nor-
plant, including the drug's creator, Dr. Sheldon Segal, have expressed concern over unor-
thodox uses of Norplant. Dr. Segal has taken a stand against forced or coerced use of
Norplant, claiming that he is "shocked that these draconian measures are coming from
the conservative right in this country." Stephanie Denmark, Birth-Control Tyranny,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1991, at A23. See also Sheldon J. Segal, Norplant Developed for all
Women, Not Just the Well-to-do, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1991, at A18.
18 See, e.g, Stacey L. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman
Control or Crime Control?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1992).
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women on welfare and has suggested that it should be made
mandatory. He has already begun distributing it to teenagers in
an inner-city high school in Baltimore.1 9 Other state measures,
arguably coercive, include offering money as an incentive for
women on welfare to have Norplant implanted or to put their
children up for adoption.20  Still others have suggested the
mandatory use of Norplant for women who use drugs or carry
the HIV virus.2
Some have argued that these proposals and the imposition
of birth control as a condition of probation are a beneficial
means of decreasing poverty and family violence.2 2 Others, how-
ever, have expressed legitimate concern that these measures will
be used disproportionately against minority women. 23 To under-
value this concern is to ignore a historical reality and an ever
present danger.
The tragedy of child abuse in the United States cannot be
minimized. Government and society must direct their attention
toward helping present victims and preventing further abuse.
The answer, however, does not lie in state-imposed contracep-
19 Maryland Governor Weighs Mandatory Birth Control, Cn. TRm., Jan. 17, 1993,
at C22. The Governor also wants to offer free vasectomies for men being released from
prison.
20 Martha Davis, War on Poverty, War on Women, N.Y. Thmns, Aug. 3, 1991, at A19
(discussing recent proposals in New Jersey and Wisconsin that would increase AFDC
benefits contingent on the mothers' agreement not to have more children).
21 Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality and Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. Rav. 1419 (1991).
2 See Thomas E. Bartrum, Birth Control as a Condition of Probation-A New
Weapon in the War Against Child Abuse, 80 Ky. L. J. 1037 (1991/1992); Poverty and
Norplant: Can Contraception Reduce the Underclass? PHIL. INQWHM Dec. 12, 1990, at
A18 (editorial) (hereinafter Poverty and Norplant).
2'This concern is by no means unfounded. In 1979 15 African-American and His-
panic women in California were sterilized without their consent or knowledge. See Mad-
rigal v. Quilligan, 639 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1979). In fact, black and Hispanic women are
disproportionately sterilized, often without their consent. Roberts, supra note 21, at
1419; see also Note, Sterilization Abuse: Current State of the Law and Remedies for
Abuse, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1147 (1980); HAmT B. P szR, STEsuRu.z; Am
FERTua1y DEcuNE iN PUERTo Rico 6 n.2 (1973) (compulsory sterilization was permitted
in Puerto Rico until 1960 for purely eugenic reasons).
Within days after the FDA had approved Norplant, an editorial appeared in the
Philadelphia Inquirer that urged the use of this new contraceptive device for poor Afri-
can-American women. Poverty and Norplant, supra note 22, at A18. In the wake of the
uproar that followed, the newspaper published an apology for the racist undertones of
the editorial Despite this recantation, concern remains that Norplant has provided a
simpler means for social engineering.
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tion.24 Forced contraception assumes that child abuse is caused
by the bearing of children and ignores the myriad underlying
factors that can be addressed in ways more productive and less
intrusive of individual rights.25 Certainly the state has an inter-
est-and a duty-to prevent future abuse and punish past of-
fenses. Intuitively, compulsory contraception would seem to pro-
vide an answer for both. However, allowing courts to make
decisions about reproduction would set a dangerous precedent
for control over who is, and is not, fit to bear children.
This Note argues that compulsory contraception is an un-
constitutional and irrational response to the problem of child
abuse and that Norplant itself creates potential dangers of gov-
ernmental intrusion into reproductive rights. In addition to
presenting common law and constitutional criticisms of compul-
sory contraception, this Note argues that the imposition of Nor-
plant as a probation condition for women convicted of child
abuse is poor public policy where alternatives exist that could
more effectively address the problem of child abuse. Part I out-
lines the history and nature of probation and discusses the ad-
vent of "creative sentencing." Part II sets forth the standards of
review presently employed by courts to determine the validity of
conditions of probation and analyzes the use of compulsory con-
traception under these validity tests. Part III argues that courts
should not only apply common law probation standards but, be-
cause a woman's reproductive rights are concerned, must also
safeguard against unconstitutional governmental intrusion. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes with a discussion of the policy impli-
cations of compulsory contraception and the advent of Norplant.
24 See, Helen Neuborne, In the Norplant Case, Good Intentions Make Bad Law,
LA. Tims, Mar. 3, 1991, at M1 (criticizing Judge Broadman's imposition of Norplant as
a condition of probation in People v. Darlene Johnson).
25 Studies of child abuse, for example, indicate that abuse is most prevalent in fami-
lies that have experienced recurrent patterns of violence, substance abuse and poverty.
These studies suggest that no meaningful solution to child abuse can be found until
these sociological problems are addressed. See, e.g., Anne Cohn Donnelly, Home Visits
Can Reduce Child Abuse, CHL TRm., Oct. 24, 1991, at 26; Sandra Evans, Guiding Par-
ents Away From Abuse, WASH. PosT, Nov. 10, 1990, at B1.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. History and Nature of Probation
Probation is the suspension of a sentence of a convicted
criminal, subject to court-ordered conditions, supervision by of-
ficers assigned by the court and provisions for revocation should
any of the conditions be violated.26 Derived from the common-
law notion of recognizance, probation became accepted as an al-
ternative to imprisonment in the United States in the middle of
the nineteenth century.27 Traditionally, courts did not view pro-
bation as a sentence, even though it served similar purposes of
rehabilitation, retribution and deterrence.28 Rather, probation
was viewed as a means of assisting convicted criminals to reinte-
grate into society and encouraging them to lead "law-abiding"
lives.29 The primary purpose of probation, unlike that of a
prison sentence, is the rehabilitation of the offender not punish-
ment or deterrence of another crime.5 0 Present state and federal
statutes stress that conditions of probation which do not serve
this end are beyond the scope of judicial authority.31
28 See COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 15, at 245.
= Id. at 7.
I There is tension between courts that view probation as a sentence and thos that
do not. See, e.g., U.S. v. Fortner, 549 F. Supp. 657, 660 (D.S.C. 1982) ("probation is a
sentence like any other sentence"); Addison v. State, 452 So.2d 955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984) ("probation does not constitute a sentence"); People v. Gilchrist, 183 Cal. Rptr.
709, 712 (Ct. App. 1982) (probation is not a form of punishment, but rather an act of
clemency within the sound discretion of the trial court and its primary purpose is reha-
bilitation, not punishment).
The distinction between viewing probation as a sentence or not becomes significant
when determining society's goals in granting probation. A sentence is intended, in part,
to punish the offender's criminal actions, whereas probation, according to its statutory
definition, is not.
29 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10 (McKinney 1987) ('The conditions of probation...
shall be such as the court, in its discretion, deems reasonably nece-sary to insure that the
defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so.").
30 See, e.g., Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980) (primary purpose
of probation is to rehabilitate the offender); Freeman v. State, 382 So. 2d 1307, 1303
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ('There is a clear distinction between a sentence and a condi-
tion of probation (citation omitted). A sentence may be imposed for one or more of the
following purposes: (a) to punish; (b) to deter similar criminal acts; (c) to protect society,
or (d) to rehabilitate. [Probation's] underlying concept is rehabilitation."); Coulson v.
State, 342 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ("if special condition of probation is so
punitive as to be unrelated to rehabilitation, it cannot be imposed"); Kominshy v. State,
330 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1976) ("special condition of probation which is so
punitive that it is unrelated to rehabilitation cannot be imposed in lieu of a uentence").
.31 See infra notes 49-51.
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
In recent decades, developments in the penal system have
led to an expanded view of the use of probation. Noting the ben-
efits it would carry both for society and the individuals involved,
penal reform advocates and legal experts have pushed for a
broader use of probation as an alternative to imprisonment.3
2
More significantly, the crisis of prison overcrowding during the
1980s was reflected in a change of attitude toward the use of
probation in lieu of a sentence.3 3 Today, every state,3 4 as well as
'2 In 1970 the American Bar Association ("ABA") endorsed the increased use of
probation as an alternative to incarceration. Among the reasons cited were:
1. to maximize the liberty of the individual while at the same time vindicating
the authority of the law and effectively protecting the public from further vio-
lations of the law;
2. to promote rehabilitation by continuing normal community contacts;
3. to reduce financial costs to the public treasury; and
4. to minimize the impact of conviction upon innocent dependents of the
offender.
ABA STANDARD RELATING TO PROBATION 27 (Approved Draft 1970).
11 As of December 31, 1989 426 out of every 100,000 Americans were incarcerated,
giving the United States the world record for the rate of incarcerated individuals per
capita. This figure represents twice that of the number incarcerated ten years before, at
a cost of approximately $16 billion a year. Carolyn Schurr, Crime and Punishment: No
Other Country Has Higher Rate of Incarceration Than U.S., 91 ABA. J. 23 (May 1991)
(citing statistics from the U.S. Justice Department's Bureau of Statistics).
34 ALA. CODE § 15-22-50 (1982 & Supp. 1988); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.090 (1984); Aniz,
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-901 (1978 & Supp. 1988); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-4-301 (1987); CAL,
PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-201 (1986 &
Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-29 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); DEN. CODE ANN,
tit. 11, § 4301 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.001 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989); GA. CODE
ANN. § 42-8-1 (1985 & Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-620 (1985 & Supp. 1987);
IDAHO CODE § 19-2601 (1987 & Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-6-1
(Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-2-1 (Burns 1985 & Supp.
1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.1 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988); KAN. CRIH. CODE ANN. § 21-
4601 (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1989); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 533.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1985 & Supp. 1988); LA. CODE CrIM. PROC. ANN. art. 893 (West 1969 & Supp. 1989); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1201 (1983 & Supp. 1988); MD. ANN. CODE § 27-641 (1988 &
Supp.); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, §§ 1-1A (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1988); MICH, CobIP.
LAws ANN. § 771.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.135 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-1 (1981 & Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 599.012
(Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-201 (1985); NEE. REV. STAT. § 29-
2250 (1985); NEv. REV. STAT. § 176.175 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2 (1986 &
Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-2(b)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-20-5 (1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00 (Consol. 1984 & Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT, §
15A-1341 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-02 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.01
(Anderson 1987 & Supp. 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991a (West 1987 & Supp.
1989); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137.520 (1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721 (Purdon 1982
& Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-2 (1981 & Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN, § 24-21-
410 (Law. Co-op. 1988); S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27-12 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN, §
40-28-101 (1982 & Supp. 1988); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 42.12 (Vernon 1979 &
[Vol. 58: 979
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the federal government, 5 has a statute authorizing courts to im-
pose probation instead of a sentence in appropriate circum-
stances and setting guidelines for conditions.
B. Creative Sentencing
In light of the expanding need for, and acceptance of, alter-
natives to incarceration, courts have increasingly sought to tailor
probation conditions to the particular crimes committed3 To
this end, courts have started to impose more individualized con-
ditions, such as those ordered for Darlene Johnson. Some "crea-
tive sentences" have included: requiring convicted child molest-
ers to post signs on their houses reading "Dangerous Sex
Offender-No Children Allowed"; 37 requiring a thief to wear
taps on the bottoms of his shoes to warn others of his ap-
proach;38 ordering white collar criminals to perform a set num-
ber of hours of community service;3 requiring a drunk driver to
put bumper stickers on his car reading "Convicted
Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (1982 & Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. Am r tit. 28, a 201
(1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (1983 & Supp. 1988); WAsH. REv. CODE ANm. § 9.95.200
(West 1988); W.VA. CODE§ 62-12-1 (1989); Was STAT. AN. § 973.09 (West 1985 & Supp.
1988); Wyo. STAT. § 7-13-201 (1987).
-" The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 first allowed federal courts to
grant probation in lieu of incarceration. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59, 3561-66, 3571-3672, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (Supp. IM 1985). Since
then, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have restricted somewhat the use of probation.
36 This inclination has increased over the past few years See Stephanie B.
Goldberg, No Baby, No Jail, 78 A.B.A J. 90 (Oct. 1992) (discussing creative sentencing
and its critics); Nancy Blodgett, Alternative Sentencing: Overcrowded Prisons Prompt
New Responses, 73 A.B. J. 32 (Nov. 1987) (describing critics and proponents of alter-
native sentencing); Faye Silas, Doing Time Outside Prison: Alternative Sentencing is
Gaining, But Slowly, 69 A.B. J. 1813 (Dec. 1983) (discussing the increase of alternative
sentencing as an outgrowth of overcrowding in the United States prison system).
A judge in Memphis, Tennessee received publicity for imposing such controversial
conditions as: ordering a defendant to stand in front of a gorilla cage in a zoo to see how
it felt to be locked up; making offenders read The Autobiography of Malcolm X and
turn in a report on it; and allowing burglary victims to visit offenders' homes (accompa-
nied by law enforcment officials) and take goods of equal value to that stolen from them.
Michael Finger, Judge Devises Instructional Penalties, N.Y. TPAns, Feb. 26, 1993, at
B16.
For more information on "creative sentencing," see Jeffrey C. Filcik, Signs of the
Times: Scarlet Letter Probation Conditions, 37 WAsH. U. J. URn & CorNss'1W. L. 291
(1990).
State v. Bateman, 765 P.2d 249 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
People v. McDowell, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Ct. App. 1976).
United States v. William Anderson Co., Inc., 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1980).
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D.U.I.-Restricted License";40 and prohibiting a prostitute from
entering a particular area of the city known for solicitation.4'
The general objective of these probation conditions is to avoid
future criminality by placing the offender beyond temptation's
reach.42 Given the nature of some of the conditions, the line be-
tween probation and a criminal sentence has blurred somewhat
and many of the "creative" probation conditions ordered have
come to look like modes of punishment. 3
The use of creative sentencing has raised a whole host of
new issues concerning appropriate conditions for various crimes.
Proponents of "alternative" sentencing argue that in addition to
alleviating prison overcrowding and reducing costs, alternative
probation terms also allow courts to punish those traditionally
difficult to penalize, such as corporations.44 Opponents of alter-
native sentencing, on the other hand, have expressed concern
that liberalized probation sets free convicted criminals who
should be behind bars.45 These opponents also argue that many
of the conditions ordered do not comply with statutory or con-
40 Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 496 So. 2d
142 (Fla. 1986).
41 In re White, 148 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Ct. App. 1979).
42 In Gilliam v. Los Angeles Municipal Court, 159 Cal. Rptr. 74 (Ct. App. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980), for example, a defendant convicted of drunk driving
was prohibited, as a condition of probation, from shopping in stores with alcohol as the
main item sold. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. In Gilliam, as in State v.
Bateman, 765 P.2d 249 (Or. Ct. App. 1987), supra note 37 and accompanying text, the
idea seems to be that the crime committed is one which could be avoided simply by
making the "cause" of the crime more inaccessible.
,3 One commentator argues that prison overcrowding and penal reform movements
have led to the increased use of probation as a means of punishment. Leonore H. Tavill,
Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty is Today's Probation Condi-
tion, 36 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 613 (1988). She analogizes certain conditions, such as that of
posting signs on houses and cars, to the colonial punishments of scarlet letters and stock-
ades. Tavill criticizes their use as a step backward toward punishment that society re-
jected as degrading and humiliating. Many states, in fact, treat probation as a sentence.
See, e.g., DEi. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4302(13) (1987) ("probation" means sentencing an
offender, without imprisonment); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2246(4) (1985) ("Probation shall
mean a sentence under which a person found guilty of a crime.., is released by a court
subject to conditions imposed by the court."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-2(b) (West 1982 &
Supp. 1988) (except where prohibited, a court may sentence a person convicted of an
offense to go on probation or face imprisonment) (cited in Filcik, supra note 36, at 17
n.20). See also Jon A. Brilliant, The Modern Day Scarlet Letter: A Critical Analysis of
Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1357.
" Tavill, supra note 43, at 619. See also supra note 32 (on the ABA's endorsement
for the use of probation).
41 Tavill, supra note 43, at 619.
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stitutional restrictions regarding probation and thus amount to
abuse of discretion by the courts."'
Offenders themselves are also involved in the debate over
alternative sentencing. 7 While most convicted criminals are too
thankful to have avoided a jail sentence to question the fairness
of their probation conditions, an increasing number of proba-
tioners are challenging them-with varying degrees of success. 8
To analyze these challenges as they pertain to the use of com-
pulsory contraception, one needs a clear understanding of the
distinction between legitimate and invalid probation conditions.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW TO DETER]MNE VALIDITY
Courts are afforded a great deal of discretion in determining
the appropriate probation conditions for convicted criminals.'0
As well as the usual conditions, such as the length of the term,
visitation by probation officers and the general requirement to
observe the law, many state statutes also provide the courts with
the opportunity to attach "special" conditions.0 While judicial
discretion is broad, however, it is not boundless.51 Rather, courts
46 See supra notes 13-17, 33-37.
47 See Polonsky, Limitations Upon Trial Court Discretion in Imposing Conditions
of Probation, 8 GA. L Rxv. 466 (1974).
48 Id. at 478.
49 See State v. Evans, 506 A.2d 695, 698 (N.L 1985) (trial court has broad discre-
tion to grant probation in order to achieve goals of punishment, deterrence, safety and
rehabilitation); People v. Lent, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905 (Cal. 1975) (trial court has broad dis-
cretion in the sentencing process, including the determination of whether probation is
appropriate and, if so, the conditions thereof). See also supra notes 34-35 and accompa-
nying text (noting the variety of state and federal statutes).
-o See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9754(c)(13) (1982) (on top of general proba-
tion conditions, the defendant must "satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to
rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible
with his freedom of conscience"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 28, § 252(b)(13) (1986) (defendant
must "satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation"); O. Ray.
STAT. § 137.540(2) (1984) ("In addition to... general conditions, the court may impose
special conditions of probation.").
51 State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 411 (S.C. 1985) (judges are allowed vde, but not
unlimited, discretion in imposing conditions of suspension of sentence or probation and
they cannot impose conditions that are illegal and void as against public policy); People
v. Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Ct. App. 1978) (court's discretion to impose conditions of
probation as granted by statute is circumscribed not only by terms of statute, but by
constitutional safeguards, including prisoner's right to enjoy a significant degree of pri-
vacy or liberty); People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1987). For a more
detailed description of the Dominguez case, see infra notes 68-72 and accompanying
text.
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are held to a standard of reasonableness in framing conditions of
probation.2 The "reasonableness" concept, however, is an amor-
phous and subjective one. Courts have struggled to define a
standard by which to determine a probation's validity. The
court in Sweeney v. United States,53 for example, held that a
condition's reasonableness was premised on the probationer's
ability to comply with it. Therefore, the court found that a pro-
bation condition that a chronic alcoholic refrain from drinking
was impossible and therefore unreasonable. Adopting a consider-
ably less stringent standard, the court in Loving v. Common-
wealth" invalidated a condition of probation requiring two co-
defendants convicted of miscegenation to leave the state and not
return together or at the same time for twenty-five years. The
court held that this condition was excessive, as the probationers
could have simply been ordered not to* cohabitate, and was
therefore unreasonable.5 5
The standard of reasonableness that has emerged can best
be viewed as a two-pronged standard. The first prong, generally
referred to as the "reasonable relationship test," is the basic
common law standard for a condition's validity. It is applied in
some form by most courts reviewing probation conditions. The
standard dictates that any condition imposed by courts must be
reasonably related to the crime for which the probationer was
convicted, to rehabilitation or to the public safety.56 The second
prong of the reasonableness standard is the constitutionality
test. Conditions of probation are subject to constitutional safe-
guards to ensure that they are not excessive and that they are
narrowly drawn to meet the goals of probation as set forth in the
52 See, e.g., State v. Macy, 403 N.W.2d 743, 745 (S.D. 1087) ("The test is one of
reasonableness."); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984) ("the condition
of probation with which we are here concerned must first be assessed in terms of its
reasonableness"); In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565 (Ct. App. 1979) ("There is an
overall requirement of reasonableness in relation to the seriousness of the offense for
which the defendant is convicted.").
- 353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1965).
- 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966). The challenged Virginia anti-miscegenation statute, al-
though upheld in this decision, was later struck down as unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
15 147 S.E.2d at 82-83.
"0 See, e.g., Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980); Rodriguez v.
State, 378 So.2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1979); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1976); People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1967).
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first prong of the validity standard.57
The reasonableness limitations have boiled down to the
point that the primary purpose of probation is rehabilitation of
the offender. "[T]he only factors which the trial court should
consider... are the appropriateness and attainability of reha-
bilitation and the need to protect the public by imposing condi-
tions which control the probationer's activities.""8 To meet these
ends, the condition must be narrowly drawn to achieve rehabili-
tation "without unnecessarily restricting the probationer's other-
wise lawful activities."' 9
The "reasonable relationship" test and the constitutionality
restrictions have not been applied uniformly by courts. Some
courts that have addressed the issue of a condition's validity
have used the prongs in conjunction with each other, balancing
the probationary goals against the offender's constitutional
rights.6 Other courts have placed a greater emphasis on one of
the prongs, even to the exclusion of the other. In Gilliam v. Los
Angeles Municipal Court,61 for example, a man was convicted of
drunk driving and ordered not to enter stores where alcohol was
a main item of sale.2 The court held that "[i]n evaluating the
validity of a condition of probation the issue is not the impact of
the condition on the defendant's constitutional rights but its
ability to meet the standard set forth in People v. Dominguez
[the reasonable relationship test]."63 Similarly, the court in Rod-
riguez v. State" did not reach the constitutional issue. The
57 See, e.g., United States v. Consuelo.Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975); State
v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Ken. Ct. App. 1989); In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Ct. App.
1979). Both of these prongs will be discussed at length at a later point in this Note.
"Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980) (invalidating condition
of probation that required defendant to forfeit all of his assets, including his home, to
the government and to work full-time for three years without pay for a charity).
1' Id. at 898.
60 See People v. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381 (Ct App. 1983) (invalidating condition
requiring a woman convicted of involuntary manslaughter to move from community
where she had lived for 24 years); In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Ct. App. 1979) (invali-
dating condition prohibiting woman convicted of prostitution from entering specified
area of city where soliciting occurred).
8- 159 Cal. Rptr. 74 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980).
Id. See supra note 42.
159 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (invalidating a condition of probation
prohibiting woman convicted of child abuse from bearing children or marrying without
the court's consent).
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court in Rodriguez, as in Gilliam, determined that since a pro-
bationer's constitutional rights are limited by the objectives of
rehabilitation, there is no constitutional issue if the condition
passes the reasonable relationship test. Here, the court held, it
did not. 5
The court in People v. Pointer,6 on the other hand, placed
more emphasis on the issue of constitutional abridgments. In
this case, significantly, a condition of compulsory contraception
was held to meet the requirements of the reasonable relationship
test, but was invalidated as an unreasonable infringement on
constitutional rights. The Pointer court indicated that certain
rights, such as that of procreation, are so fundamental that the
common law standard is not, by itself, sufficiently stringent to
be dispositive of the court's ability to abridge those rights.6 7 As
probation conditions become more draconian-the forced impo-
sition of Norplant being a most vivid example-and the poten-
tial dangers of judicial abuse become more clear, courts must en-
sure, as the Pointer court did, that the probationer's
constitutional rights are protected.
A. The Common Law Reasonable Relationship Standard
People v. Dominguez"8 is the leading case that articulates
the reasonable relationship standard. In Dominguez a twenty-
year-old unmarried woman was convicted of second degree rob-
bery and placed on probation. The trial court ordered, as part of
her probation, that she was neither to live with any man to
whom she was not married nor to become pregnant until she was
married."' The California Court of Appeals in the Second Dis-
trict voided these probation conditions on the grounds that they
were not reasonably related to the crime of robbery.70 The
es Id. at 9-10.
199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984); see infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
o Id. at 365.
64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1967).
Id. at 292.
The third condition is that you are not to live with any man to whom you are
not married and you are not to become pregnant until after you become mar-
ried. Now this will develop by just becoming pregnant. You are going to prison
unless you are married first. You already have too many of those.
70 Id. at 293.
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Dominiquez court set forth the following factors that would
render a probation condition invalid: if it (1) forbids or requires
conduct that is not reasonably related to future criminality; (2)
relates to conduct that is not in itself criminal; and (3) has no
relationship to the crime for which the offender was convicted."
Many other courts have adopted this test, upholding or invali-
dating probation conditions under the Dominguez factors
2
There is also a federal court version of the Dominiquez test,
although it is worded slightly differently. In the leading case,
United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 3 the court invalidated a
condition of probation that required a defendant convicted of
heroin possession to submit to a search at any time when re-
quested by a law enforcement officer. The court set forth the
following factors to be examined as part of the reasonable rela-
tionship test: (1) the purposes sought to be served by probation;
(2) the extent to which the full constitutional guarantees availa-
ble to citizens at large should be accorded to probationers; and
(3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement."4 Although the fed-
eral test appears to incorporate some element of the constitu-
tionality standard in the second prong of the reasonableness
test, federal courts applying the test have, in fact, tended to
stress the first and third prong. As with the Dominguez test ap-
plied in state courts, federal courts are primarily concerned that
a condition of probation serve the probationary functions of
public safety and, more important, rehabilitation.
71 Id.
72 Wiggins v. State, 386 So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding invalid a condi-
tion of probation prohibiting sexual intercourse with individuals other than defendant's
lawfully married spouse); State v. Means, 257 N.W.2d 595 (S.D. 1977) (holding valid a
condition of defendant's bail, analogized to probation, that he not participate in any
American Indian Movement activities except fundraising); State v. Livingston, 372
N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio 1976) (invalidating probation condition prohibiting a man convicted
of child abuse from fathering a child).
73 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
74 Id. at 262. In Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980), the court
modified this test somewhat by applying it in a two-part analysis. The court wrote:
First, we consider the purposes for which the judge imposed the condi-
tions. If the purposes are permissible [ie., for rehabilitation of the offender],
the second step is to determine whether the conditions are reasonably related
to the purposes. In conducting the latter inquiry, the court examine3 the im-
pact which the conditions have on the probationer's rights. If the impact is
substantially greater than is necessary to carry out the purpose, the conditions
are impermissible.
Id. at 897.
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Dominguez, of course, was a relatively easy case: the crime
was completely unrelated to the woman's pregnancies and the
condition was therefore a ludicrous one. Proponents of forced
contraception for child abusers note, however, that child abuse
is more closely connected to the bearing of a child. They argue
that child abuse offenders would be effectively prevented from
committing such a crime again had they no other children to
abuse.7 5 Linked to this rationale is the strong and understanda-
ble emotional reaction brought on by the tragic incidence of
child abuse reported in the United States in recent years.70
These arguments are compelling and difficult to refute. More-
over, the addition of another child may well compound the
stress of an already turbulent household and add to the number
of children in foster care.
The above arguments notwithstanding, compulsory contra-
ception will, in most cases, fail the reasonable relationship test.
In fact, most courts that have addressed the issue have deter-
mined that a probation condition prohibiting an offender from
becoming pregnant or fathering children does not meet the re-
quirements of the Dominguez test.7 First, a condition of proba-
tion requiring an offender convicted of child abuse to refrain
from having children does not sufficiently relate to future crimi-
nality. A condition of probation must relate to the deterrence of
a similar crime and must not be overbroad in its effort to pro-
vide such deterrence. Preventing a child abuse offender from
bearing more children will not ensure that she will refrain from
abusing her existing children nor will it help her acquire better
parenting skills or cope with the economic and sociological fac-
tors many feel are at the root of child abuse.7 8 Although 'some of
the conditions ordered by Judge Broadman in People v. Darlene
Johnson e were aimed at preventing future child abuse-such as
75 See Albert Kaupas, An Eye for an Eye, CHL TRB., Feb. 12, 1991, at 14.
11 Approximately 2.5 million cases of suspected child abuse or neglect are reported
each year in the United States. Donnelly, supra note 25, at 26.
"' See supra notes 11, 13 & 68-72 and accompanying text. In People v. Pointer the
court held that compulsory contraception did meet the requirements of the Dominguez
reasonable relationship test for a woman whose "abuse" would have harmed her fetus.
199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984); see infra notes 85-93. The court invalidated the con-
dition, however, on the grounds that the condition was an unreasonable burden on her
constitutional rights.
78 See Coyle, supra note 11. See also Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
", See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
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parental counseling and the prohibition against using corporal
punishment on her children-the Norplant condition does not,
by itself, address the rehabilitative objectives of probation and is
therefore unreasonable.
Second, pregnancy and childbirth are not, in and of them-
selves, crimes. As such, the requirement that a woman refrain
from these activities is outside the scope of a court's discretion
in setting conditions of probation. Such a condition deals only
with the symptoms of the tragedy of child abuse, rather than the
disease.
The third prong of the Dominguez test, the reasonable rela-
tionship prong, is the most analytically troublesome. Thus far,
courts have held that compulsory contraception has only a tan-
gential relationship to the crime of child abuse. 0 For example,
in Rodriguez v. State"' the court prohibited a woman convicted
of aggravated child abuse from marrying, becoming pregnant or
retaining custody of her children. On appeal, the Florida District
Court, Second Division, held that although the custody condi-
tion has a clear relationship to child abuse, the marriage and
pregnancy conditions do not, and are therefore invalid.82 In a
case factually very similar, State v. Livingston,e3 the Ohio Court
of Appeals held that marriage and pregnancy conditions of pro-
bation were invalid because they bore little relationship to the
crime of child abuse. Neither court, however, delved into the
reasonable relationship prong in any detail, as they had more
fully with the other parts of the Dominguez test, but rather
stated this proposition succinctly and conclusively.8 4
The reasonable relationship test was given an interesting
and significant twist as it applies to court-ordered contraception
by the California Court of Appeals in People v. Pointer 5 In
Pointer a mother of two children was convicted of child endan-
germent. A strict adherent to a rigorous macrobiotic diet, Ms.
80 State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. App. 1989); Pointer, 199 CaL Rptr. at 357;
Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (FIa. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
81 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
2 Id. at 10.
1" 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio CL. App. 1976).
In Rodriguez, for example, the court merely stated that "[ihe conditions relating
to marriage and pregnancy have no relationship to the crime of child abuse" without
examining it any further. See 378 So. 2d at 10. The Livingston court was just as brief.
372 N.E.2d at 1335.
199 CaL Rptr. 357 (CL App. 1984).
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Pointer continued on this diet while breast-feeding her children
and imposed the diet on them despite repeated warnings by her
doctor.s6 At the ages of two and four years old, the children were
significantly malnourished;87 Ms. Pointer was brought up on
charges when her younger child, Jamal, was hospitalized in an
emaciated and nearly comatose condition." Jamal suffered from
severe growth retardation and brain damage as a result of the
macrobiotic diet forced upon him."' Ms. Pointer was found
guilty by a jury and placed on probation. Among the conditions
of her probation were the denial of custody of her children with-
out prior court approval and the requirement that she not con-
ceive during the term of her probation. 0 Unlike previous courts,
the California Court of Appeals, applying the Dominguez rea-
sonable relationship test, held that this latter condition was rea-
sonable.8 1 The Pointer court distinguished its previous holdings
and similar cases in other jurisdictions by stating that
those cases relied heavily upon the fact that the abuse could be en-
tirely avoided by removal of any children from the custody of the de-
fendant. This case is distinguishable, however, because of evidence
that the harm sought to be prevented. . . may occur before birth...
Since the record fully supports the trial court's belief that appellant
would continue to adhere to a strict macrobiotic diet despite the dan-
ger it presents to any child she might conceive, we cannot say that the
condition of probation prohibiting conception is completely unrelated
to the crime .... 92
Significantly, the court ultimately invalidated the probation con-
dition on the grounds that even if it met the requirements of
the Dominguez test it was unconstitutionally overbroad and in-
vasive of a woman's fundamental right to procreate.9 3
8' Macrobiotics is a diet composed almost exclusively of legumes, vegetables and
grains. Fish, meat, poultry and dairy products are forbidden, as is fruit and most salads.
See id. at 359 n.2.
:7 Id. at 359.
8 Id. at 360.
89 Id.
90 Id.
9I Id. at 364.
92 Id. (footnote omitted)
"s Id. at 365. The recent trend of prosecuting pregnant women who use drugs or
alcohol highlights the importance of the Pointer decision. Despite the raging battle over
fetal rights, no court has yet convicted a woman of child abuse for her conduct while
pregnant, although one court in Florida convicted a woman of delivering cocaine to a
minor child-through her umbilical cord at birth. State v. Johnson, No. 89-890-CFA
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All told, the imposition of Norplant as a condition of proba-
tion can only be seen as punitive and is therefore not permissi-
ble under statutory definitions of probation. The court in Hig-
don v. United States" stressed that "punishment of an offender
may not be the primary purpose of the judge's imposition of
probation. '9 5 This theme is mirrored in the history of probation
and the numerous statutes and cases that have arisen in recent
decades.98 Other courts have taken this notion a step further,
insisting that any motivation other than rehabilitation or refor-
mation of the probationer is beyond the statutory scope of the
(Seminole County, Fla. 1989). This court was ultimately overruled by Florida's highest
court. See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992). See also In re Valerie D., 613
A.2d 748 (Conn. 1992). However, courts have begun actively to scrutinize the conduct of
pregnant women and have sought to restrict, or direct, their actions in the name of fetal
protection. To this end, pregnant women have been forced to undergo medical treatment
(including blood transfusions and caesareans). See, e.g., In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C.
App. 1987), reh'g denied, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. App. 1988), vacated, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C.
App. 1988); In re Maydun, 114 Daily Wash. Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1986); Raleigh
Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 985 (1964); In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006 (N.Y. 1985). Pregnant women
have also been incarcerated. Stallman v. Youngquist, 473 N.E.2d 400 (Ill. Ct. App. 1934),
rev'd, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988). See also D.C. Judge Jails Woman as Protec-
tion for Fetus, WAsH. POST, July 23, 1988, at Al. Over 160 women throughout the United
States have been prosecuted for exposing their newborn children to drugs. Mark Hansen,
Courts Side with Moms in Drug Cases: Florida Woman's Conviction Overturned for
Delivering Cocaine via Umbilical Cord, 78 A.BA J. 18 (1992). Studies indicate, more-
over, that these measures are having a disproportionate impact on minority and low-
income women. Deborah J. Krauss, Regulating Women's Bodies: The Adverse Effect of
Fetal Rights Theory on Childbirth Decisions and Women of Color, 26 HARv. CI-CL. L.
REv. 523 (1991).
The Pointer decision, on the other hand, supports the conclusion that women do
not, by becoming pregnant, forfeit their constitutional rights to privacy and bodily integ-
rity. See also International Union v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (holding as
discriminatory an employer's policy barring all women, except thoze who:o infertility
could be documented, from jobs involving actual or potential expo3ure to lead, a sub-
stance possibly harmful to fetuses). This conclusion is particularly significant in light of
recent studies which suggest that the use of drugs and alcohol by women during preg-
nancy may have less of an impact on fetal and child development than other factors such
as income, access to health care and similar characteristics of the father. See Joan E.
Bertin, Fetal Attraction: Controlling Women to Protect Fetuses, BMLAW, voL H, No. 48
(1991); Ricardo Yazigi et al, Demonstration of Specific Binding of Cocaine to Human
Spermatozoa, 266 JAMA 1956 (1991); Nesrin Bingol et al., The Influence of Socioeco-
nomic Factors on the Occurrence of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, in AvA2Ncns iN ALCOHOL
AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE 105 (1987).
- 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980).
05 Id. at 898.
See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
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courts' authority.97 In Dominguez and State v. Livingston, the
courts emphasized that a judge may not be motivated by his or
her desire to attain other social goals, such as alleviating the tax-
payers' burden of maintaining illegitimate children.98
In prohibiting Ms. Johnson from bearing any more children,
the court asserted its own utilitarian-and highly subjec-
tive-opinion that, aside from her crime, society would be better
off if Ms. Johnson were prevented from having any more chil-
dren.99 Such social utility concerns are beyond the scope of the
'7 State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977); People v. Dominguez,
64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1967).
" The Dominguez court, in analogizing the condition of compulsory contraception
to that of banishment, stated that "[a] court is not permitted to shift the public burden
of taking care of persons who the court believes are undesirable by ostracizing an of-
fender in the guise of granting him probation." 64 Cal. Rptr. at 294. Similarly, the court
went on to say, "[t]he burden upon taxpayers to maintain illegitimate children at the
public expense is a grave problem, but a court cannot use its awesome power in imposing
conditions of probation to vindicate the public interest in reducing the welfare rolls by
applying unreasonable conditions of probation." Id. The Livingston court quoted this
language in invalidating compulsory contraception as a condition of probation. 372
N.E.2d at 1337.
9 In an interview with 60 Minutes Judge Broadman denied that his probation order
in People v. Darlene Johnson was motivated by any economic or social concerns other
than Ms. Johnson's own best interests and that of her children. See 60 Minutes, supra
note 1. However, in a case similar to the Johnson case, Judge Broadman stated to the
defendant:
I want to make [sic] to make it clear that one of the reasons I am making this
order is you've got five children. You're thirty years old. None of your children
are in your custody or control. Two of them on AFDC. And I'm afraid that if
you get pregnant we're going to get a cocaine or heroin addicted baby.
People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 263, 267 (Ct. App. 1992). The court in Zaring, in de-
claring Judge Broadman's probation condition unconstitutional, noted that "[tihere are
other disturbing aspects of this case upon which we should comment. Specifically, we
note the apparent imposition of personal social values in the sentencing decision." Id. at
373. The court added that
the morality of having children while on public assistance, and the imposing of
any constitutionally permissible legal deterrences to such a practice, are mat-
ters properly left to the wisdom and judgment of the legislature elected by the
people, and not to the morality of individual judges. The comments by the trial
court imply consideration of inappropriate factors in the sentencing process
under the facts of this case.
Id. at 374. One cannot discount the fact that proposals for coerced contraception have
thus far been directed mainly at poor, minority women.
The Johnson case was not the first in which Judge Broadman has come under fire
for ordering an unorthodox condition of probation. He has gained some notoriety for a
number of cases, including ordering a child molester to remain under house arrest and
to attach a sign to his house publicizing his conviction; ordering an alcoholic to swallow
Antabuse (a drug that causes violent illness if alcohol is subsequently consumed); and
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court's discretion and are proscribed by statutes granting courts
the power to set probation.110  Moreover, this "solution" to child
abuse skirts many of the real issues surrounding family violence,
such as poverty, inability to cope with stress and substance
abuse.
The Dominguez reasonable relationship test is a malleable
one and, despite previous rulings, proponents of compulsory
contraception have a strong argument that court-ordered birth
control may protect future children and benefit public safety.
The inquiry does not stop there, however. Since fundamental
rights are at risk and because there are dangers inherent in al-
lowing the government to make decisions regarding reproduc-
tion, courts must make a very strong showing that conditions
restricting reproduction are reasonable. An examination of the
constitutionality standard-the second prong of the reasonable-
ness test-reveals that this burden is a difficult one to meet.
B. Constitutional Standard
Along with the common law reasonable relationship require-
ment, courts are limited by certain constitutional safeguards in
setting probation conditions.101 Probation conditions that in-
fringe on fundamental rights are held up to special scrutiny, par-
ticularly where the condition is an unusual one, 02 or the in-
fringement is particularly onerous. 03 While courts have upheld
imprisoning a woman for appearing a half hour late for a court hearing because she had
taken her children to school. John Hurst, Controversial Judge Dodges Not Only Critics,
But Bullets, LA Tis, Apr. 29, 1991, at AS.
100 See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., U.S. v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Any search
made pursuant to condition included in terms of probation must necessarily meet Fourth
Amendment standards of reasonableness."); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct.
App. 1984) ("[Wlhere a condition of probation impinges upon exercise of a fundamental
right and is challenged on constitutional grounds, we must additionally determine
whether the condition is impermissibly overbroad."); People v. Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184
(Ct. App. 1978); see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
102 In U.S. v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1976), the court held invalid a condition
requiring a man convicted of filing false income tax returns to resign from the bar stating
that "careful scrutiny of an unusual and severe probation condition is appropriate." Id.
at 681. The court did not define the term "unusual," but did imply that special condi-
tions beyond those listed in 18 U.S.C. section 3651---such as fines, restitution and partic-
ipation in a community treatment center-may be subject to strict appellate review.
103 U.S. v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 265 ("Conditions that unquestionably re-
strict otherwise inviolable constitutional rights may properly be subject to special scr-
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certain reasonable restrictions in the interest of public safety
and rehabilitation, 1°4 many courts have also recognized the need
to protect probationers' fundamental rights to privacy and lib-
erty.10 5 Probation conditions may not be excessively harsh,100 or
place unreasonable burdens on the probationer's constitutional
rights.107 Furthermore, the condition must be narrowly drawn to
meet the primary goal of probation statutes, which is the reha-
bilitation of the offender. 08 Thus, as the Pointer court pointed
out, even if the condition is reasonably related to the crime com-
mitted and rehabilitation, it may still be inappropriate if it bur-
dens a constitutional right.1 09
In In re White'" the California Court of Appeals articu-
lated the rational and balanced criteria that should be applied to
determine whether probation conditions impermissibly infringe
on constitutional rights. The criteria adequately incorporate the
common law and constitutional standards for validity. In White
a woman convicted of soliciting an act of prostitution was for-
bidden as a condition of her probation to enter a designated area
of the city of Fresno where prostitution was prevalent. 1 This
restriction was voided on appeal as being too broad and an un-
reasonable infringement of the defendant's constitutional right
to travel, a right "implicit in the concept of a democratic society
and. . . one of the attributes of personal liberty under common
law." ' 2 The court set forth the following test for determining a
condition's reasonableness: (1) whether the condition is reasona-
bly related to the intended purpose of the legislation conferring
the benefit [in this case, that of probation]; (2) whether the
value to the public of the imposition of this condition manifestly
tiny to determine whether the limitation does in fact serve the dual objectives of rehabil-
itation and public safety.").
104 People v. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381 (Ct. App. 1983).
105 People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984); In re White, 158 Cal. Rptr.
562 (Ct. App. 1979); People v. Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Ct. App. 1978).
100 Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1980).
People v. Beach, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
108 Wiggins v. State, 386 So. 2d 46, 47 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980); Kominsky v. State, 330
So. 2d 800 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976). For a discussion of rehabilitation, see supra notes 58-59
and accompanying text.
'o' See supra note 67.
o 158 Cal. Rptr. 562 (Ct. App. 1979).
m Id. at 564.
111 Id. at 567.
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outweighs any impairment of constitutional rights; and (3)
whether there are any alternative means less subversive of the
constitutional right, narrowly drawn so as to correlate more
closely with the purposes contemplated by conferring the bene-
fit.113 An examination of the nature of the rights being infringed
by the forced imposition of Norplant indicates that this condi-
tion places an unreasonable and overbroad burden on funda-
mental rights and does not meet the constitutional standards set
by probation statutes and' the White test.
1. The General Nature of Constitutional Rights to Privacy,
Procreation and Bodily Integrity
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that
individuals have a fundamental right, protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment's safeguards of human dignity and auton-
omy, to make personal decisions about issues surrounding
childbearing114 and contraception.1 5 Over twenty-five years ago,
the Supreme Court held in Griswold v. Connecticut"' that a
state statute prohibiting the use of contraception implicates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.27 The Court
reasoned that the penumbras of the specific protections listed in
the Bill of Rights-such as the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments-overlapped to form a "zone of privacy"
into which the government may not intrude." 8 Marriage-and
by extension the marital bedroom-falls within that "zone of
privacy.")
The Court later extended the right to privacy to include un-
married individuals, holding in Eisenstadt v. Baird"" that a
Massachusetts law prohibiting only single persons from ob-
taining birth control violates the Equal Protection Clause. Jus-
tice Brennan, writing for the Court, said "[i]f the right of pri-
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
213 Id. at 568.
114 Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
115 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
'*2 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
217 Id. at 485.
1's Id. at 486.
119 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child. '120
Since Eisenstadt, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that
a woman's fundamental right to reproductive freedom is pro-
tected by the federal Constitution. 121 Furthermore, this right ap-
plies not only to a woman's right not to bear a child, but also to
her right to bear one. 22 In its most recent abortion decision,
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,'22
the Court reaffirmed its prior holdings that a woman's right to
terminate a pregnancy is a fundamental liberty interest, even
while it substantially restricted access to abortion for many
women. In upholding Roe v. Wade the Court recognized its ex-
tension to other aspects of decisions regarding procreation:
If indeed the woman's interest in deciding whether to bear and beget
a child had not been recognized as in Roe, the State might as readily
restrict a woman's right to choose to carry a pregnancy to term as to
terminate it, to further asserted state interests in population control,
or eugenics, for example. Yet Roe has been sensibly relied upon to
counter any such suggestions. 124
The Supreme Court has recognized that the constitutional
right to bodily integrity encompasses not only reproductive au-
tonomy, but also the right to make one's own decisions about
medical treatment. 2 5 This right has evolved out of the common
law doctrine of informed consent 26 and the constitutional guar-
120 Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
121 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122 See supra note 115. See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
123 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
124 Id. at 2811 (citations omitted). See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (holding the right to procreate to be a fundamental right protected by the Consti-
tution); Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that Roe sup-
ports right not to be wrongfully sterilized).
"" Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); see also In
re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
110 See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Ct. App.
1981). "Informed consent" is the principle of law that requires a physician to make a full
disclosure of facts--including the risks involved and the alternatives--so that a patient
may make an intelligent decision about whether to pursue a particular course of treat-
ment. While actions against doctors are usually brought on grounds of negligence, the
failure of a doctor to get a patient's fully informed consent has also been held to be a
battery. Id. at 376, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
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antee of privacy.127 The notion of bodily integrity and informed
consent have long been established principles of our legal system
and of constitutional interpretation. In 1891 the Supreme Court
wrote in Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford1 2 8 that "[n]o right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and con-
trol of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others... ." The right of an individual to decide on medical
treatment has been held to include the right to refuse medical
treatment. 29 Yet the right to refuse medical treatment is not
absolute. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health3 ° the Court acknowledged that individuals have a signif-
icant liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to refuse medical treatment, but held that
this interest must be balanced against any legitimate state inter-
ests. In Cruzan, where the patient in question was incompetent,
these interests included the need to determine by "clear and
convincing evidence" whether the person, if competent, would
have chosen to refuse such treatment. Had Cruzan been compe-
tent, the Court stressed, the right to decline the life support sys-
tem would have been assumed. 3 '
Thus, the Supreme Court has firmly established that the
Constitution protects the rights of individuals to make personal
decisions about childbearing and medical treatment. As a result,
it would appear on the surface that the imposition of compul-
sory contraception is an unreasonable infringement of a woman's
fundamental right to procreative choice and bodily integrity.
'2 See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417 (Mass. 1977).
1- 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). See also Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,
105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. CL App. 1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an asault").
129 Cruzan v. Director, Nission Dept. of Health, 110 S. CL 2841 (1990). But see
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). In Jacobson the Supreme Court held that
an individual has no right under the Due Process Clause to reject an unwanted smallpox
vaccination over the state's interest in administering it.
120 110 S. Ct. at 2841. In Cruzan a young woman was being kept alive-but in a
persistent, and permanent, vegetative state-following a car accident. When the doctors
determined that she would never recover, her parents sought to have her removed from a
life-sustaining hydration and nutrition apparatus.
,31 Id. at 2852. But see infra notes 157-61 (discussion of prisoners' rights to refuse
medical treatment).
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Just as the state may not prohibit an individual from using con-
traception, it may not force her to do so. Similarly, the state
cannot require a competent adult to accept unwanted medical
treatment. This is particularly significant where the treatment is
a procedure that is intrusive and potentially detrimental to one's
health, as is Norplant.13 2 Were Darlene Johnson not on proba-
tion, such a government order would clearly be unconstitu-
tional. 33 Nor does the status of the individual as a probationer
validate such infringements. 4 While the constitutional rights of
convicted criminals in prison are subject to some restrictions,
probationers' rights are not similarly curtailed.
2. Constitutional Rights in the Prison Context
Incarcerated individuals are not afforded the same constitu-
tional protections as other citizens. This is true even where the
constitutional infringement is not expressly imposed, but rather
arises out of the context in which criminals are placed. That is,
imprisonment itself carries with it the inevitable loss or limita-
tion of many significant rights, particularly liberty interests.3 5
Given the nature of prison and the institutional concerns of se-
curity, maintenance and discipline, the Supreme Court has held
that incarcerated individuals can have no reasonable expectation
of privacy or freedom from unreasonable searches. 36 Similarly,
they do not enjoy the same degree of protection of freedom of
association and speech.3 It is important to recognize, however,
132 See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Washington
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
133 But see Martha Davis, War on Poverty, War on Women, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,
1991, at A19 (discussing recent proposals in New Jersey and Wisconsin that would in-
crease Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") benefits contingent on the
mothers' agreement not to bear any more children); Jim Simon, Heavy Hand of Welfare
Reform-Legislators Planning to Get Tough, SEArmE TnsS, Jan. 31, 1992, at Bi; Gov-
ernor's Welfare Plan Pushes Free Birth Control, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1993, at 27.
I" See, e.g., State v. Mosburg, 768 PY2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); Thomas v. State,
519 So.2d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App.
1984).
"I Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (prison regulation restricting mailing of
books to prisoners did not violate First Amendment).
"I Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (unauthorized search of prison cell
and deprivation of property did not violate Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments).
I" Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (prison regulation restricting the
sending of publications to inmates is valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (refusing to apply a "least
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that these restrictions are based not on some notion that con-
victs lose rights as part of their punishment, but rather on the
more practical needs and nature of prison confinement239 In-
deed, the Supreme Court has consistently held that prisoners do
not lose all of their constitutional rights when they enter jail.1 3
In Procunier v. Martinez,140 the first case in which the Su-
preme Court addressed the issue of First Amendment rights for
prisoners, the Court struck down a California regulation that re-
stricted the personal correspondence of prisoners as an unconsti-
tutional violation of First Amendment rights. The Court at-
tempted to strike a balance between the protection of the
fundamental rights of prisoners and the legitimate penological
interests of internal order, institutional security and rehabilita-
tion of the inmates."' Martinez was substantially narrowed by
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 42 in which the Court applied a "more
deferential" approach than the Martinez reasonableness stan-
dard. Now, prison officials have a great deal of discretion in de-
termining which regulations are in the best interests of the safe
and efficient running of penal institutions. Still, Martinez and
the cases that followed illustrate the notion that the restriction
of prisoners' constitutional rights is a result of the prison con-
text, not of criminal status per se. Some of these constitutional
restrictions have extended to the right to make personal deci-
sions about childbearing, conception and medical treatment.
restrictive alternative" standard for regulation of prison rules affecting religious observa-
tion); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (upholding regula-
tions by North Carolina Department of Correction prohibiting inmates from soliciting
other inmates to join union).
13 This has not always been the case. Until the twentieth century prisoners were
not held to be covered at all by the Bill of Rights. See Virginia L. Hardwick, Note,
Punishing the Innocent: Unconstitutional Restrictions on Prison Marriage and Visita-
tion, 60 N.Y.U. L REv. 275 (1985). In Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871),
the Supreme Court said that a prisoner "has, as a consequence of his crime, not only
forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its human-
ity accords to him."
139 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
555-56 (1974) (holding that no "iron curtain" separates prison from the Constitution and
that prisoners enjoy the protection of due process); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974) (prisoners retain those First Amendment rights of speech not "inconsistent with
[their] status as... prisoner[s] or with the legitimate penological objectives of the cor-
rections system").
1- 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
14 Id. at 413.
490 U.S. 401 (1989).
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The history of restrictions on incarcerated women's procrea-
tive rights is a long and complex one, more so even than for
other women. The 1920s saw an upsurge of the Eugenics move-
ment in the United States.14 Influenced by the theories of Gre-
gor Mendel, eugenicists believed that individuals who were seen
as genetically defective or socially unfit-e.g., criminals and the
mentally incompetent-should be sterilized as a means of im-
proving society."," The movement was a powerful one. During
the first half of this century, approximately 60,000 incarcerated
or mentally handicapped women were sterilized in the United
States.145 Women were not the only ones affected. Men con-
victed of sexual assault or child molestation were also offered
sterilization as a term of plea.1 4 1 Moreover, the movement's in-
fluence was far-reaching. Adolph Hitler, for example, founded
his notions of the "Master Race" and the improvement of Ger-
man society on the ideas of the American Eugenics movement.1 4
The Eugenics movement reached its culmination in 1927
with the Supreme Court's decision in Buck v. Bell.'48 In Buck,
the first reproductive rights case in the United States, the Su-
preme Court held that the sterilization of mentally retarded
women was constitutional and necessary for the elimination of
those considered socially unfit.149 Since the Buck decision, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has repeatedly determined that the
rights to marry and procreate are fundamental and survive in-
carceration. Thus, the Court has narrowed the circumstances
14 See Coyle, supra note 11, at 247.
14 Id. at 254.
Stefan, supra note 11, at 413.
'" See, e.g., Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918); Davis v. Berry, 216 F.
413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1914); People v. Gauntlett,
352 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Feilin, 126 P. 75 (Wash. 1912).
111 Coyle, supra note 11, at 247. In a rather telling example of history repeating
itself, David Duke, a former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan and member of the neo-
Nazi party, included as part of his platform in the 1991 Louisiana gubernatorial race a
plan to "encourage" mothers receiving welfare benefits (a large percentage of whom are
African-American) to have Norplant implanted. See Stephanie Denmark, Birth Control
Tyranny, N.Y. TnmEs, Oct. 19, 1991, at A23.
148 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
"I Id. This case gave rise to Justice Holmes's famous quotation that "three genera.
tions of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207. In fact, later evidence indicated that Carrie
Buck, the Virginia woman whose sterilization was upheld, was not mentally retarded.
Her child, who died at the age of eight, was a member of her school's honor roll. Stefan,
supra note 11, at 413-14 n.35.
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under which an incarcerated individual's right to procreate
could be curtailed by the state. In Skinner v. Oklahoma= 0 the
Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that provided for auto-
matic sterilization of criminals convicted of three felonies as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.151 Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, determined that a criminal offender's right
to procreate was a "basic civil right" that is "fundamental to the
very survival of the race. 1 1 52 The Court later held in Turner v.
Safley 55 that a Missouri Division of Corrections regulation per-
mitting inmates to marry only with the prison superintendent's
permission unconstitutionally burdened prisoners' fundamental
right to marry.'"
Of course, the very nature of criminal confinement requires
some restrictions on the right to privacy and procreation. Prison
administrators are granted wide discretion to impose regulations
they deem necessary for the safe and efficient maintenance of
penal institutions.1 55 Many of these regulations-such as those
concerning conjugal visitation-have effectively curtailed the
ability of incarcerated individuals to enjoy privacy rights. 58
Thus, the Supreme Court's determination that these rights are
150 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
151 Id. at 538.
152 Id. at 541. Despite the Skinner decision several states continue to have laws al-
lowing for the compulsory sterilization of criminals or the mentally incompetent. See,
e.g., MsS. CODE ANN. § 41-45-1 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-36 (1990); W. VA. CODE § 27-
16-1 (1986). It is unlikely that these laws, if challenged, would withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
15 482 U.S. 78 (1986).
15 Id. at 95-96 ("Many important attributes of marriage remai.. after taking
into account the limitations imposed by prison life.... Taken together, we conclude that
these elements are sufficient to form a constitutionally protected marital relationship in
the prison context.").
255 See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
156 In Cromwell v. Coughlin, for example, a prisoner was denied conjugal visits while
serving a term of 18 years to life. He argued that this denial deprived him of his funda-
mental right to marital relations. Judge Leonard Sand of the Southern District of New
York held that incarcerated individuals do indeed have such a right, but that more fac-
tual information was required before he could rule on whether legitimate state interests
justified a limitation of that right. 773 F. Supp. 606, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). See also Good-
win v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990) (assuming that the fundamental right to
procreation survives incarceration, regulation of the Bureau of Prisons restricting inmate
procreation, including artificial insemination of wives by male inmates, is valid as reason-
ably related to legitimate penological interests); but see Rigsby v. Lewis, 884 F.2d 1395
(9th Cir. 1989) (prisoner is constitutionally entitled to conjugal visits while in prison).
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not automatically voided in the prison context appears to con-
flict with the realities of the prison environment.
The prison context also imposes limits on the prisoners'
rights to bodily integrity and autonomy. As with the right to pri-
vacy and procreation, the right to refuse medical treatment tech-
nically survives conviction and incarceration. A number of
courts have addressed this issue in the context of the adminis-
tration of anti-psychotic or tranquilizing drugs to prisoners
against their will. 1 7 In Vitek v. Jones158 the Supreme Court held
that, while criminal conviction inevitably leads to certain cur-
tailments of freedom, it does not authorize a state to subject an
inmate to involuntary treatment with psychotropic drugs. The
Court narrowed this holding in Washington v. Harper.59 In
Washington the Court recognized inmates' significant liberty in-
terest in refusing medical treatment, but held that "[t]he extent
of a prisoner's right under the Due Process Clause to avoid the
unwanted administration of anti-psychotic drugs must be de-
fined in the context of the inmate's confinement.' ' 0 The Court
held that given the realities of the prison environment, the Due
Process Clause permits the state to treat prisoners against their
wills when (1) they present a danger to themselves or others in
the institution and (2) it is in the prisoners' best medical
interests. 61
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the is-
sue of a prisoner's right to refuse medical treatment other than
'57 See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), infra notes 159-61 and ac-
companying text; Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), infra note 158 and accompanying
text; Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984) (forced injection of anti-psychotic
drugs is unconstitutional where the state cannot show adequate evidence that its inter-
ests are significant enough to outweigh prisoner's liberty interest); Mackey v. Procunier,
477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding that the forcible administration of drugs which
have frightening or painful side effects can, in and of itself, constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Large v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d
399 (Ariz. 1986) (forcible medication of an inmate with anti-psychotic drugs is prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of compelling state interests).
Some courts have argued that the forcible medication of inmates with mind-altering
or behavior-modifying drugs also implicates the defendant's First Amendment right to
be free of governmental control over thought processes, as well as the right to a fair trial
if the medication is administered beforehand. See Bee, 744 F.2d at 1395.
1:58 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
59 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
160 Id. at 222.
161 Id. at 227.
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that necessitated by a severe mental disorder, it is unlikely that
a correctional institution would be able to enforce a regulation
requiring compulsory contraception of inmates.10 2 Such a regula-
tion would have difficulty passing the Washington test for a
valid infringement of a prisoner's right to refuse medical treat-
ment. First, state-imposed contraception has little bearing on
the state's concerns for a safe institution. While society would
understandably want to discourage children being born into the
prison environment, a pregnant woman hardly presents the
same degree of danger as a schizophrenic or violent inmate. Sec-
ond, forced administration of birth control will rarely be in the
woman's best medical interest. Many contraceptive devices, par-
ticularly the birth control pill, IUD and Norplant-which are
the most easily enforced and most effective-cause unpleasant,
even dangerous side effects. Still, it is important to understand
the extent to which inmates' rights to bodily integrity may be
limited by being imprisoned.
3. Constitutional Rights in the Context of Probation
Probationers, although not incarcerated, are still convicted
criminals and as such are subject to certain limitations on their
liberty."" Indeed, the constitutional protections afforded a pro-
bationer lie somewhere between those afforded an incarcerated
criminal and a law-abiding citizen, raising the question of which
standard of rights applies.'" A number of courts have denied
constitutional challenges on behalf of probationers to state ac-
tions that would have been unconstitutional if applied to ordi-
nary citizens. For example, courts have validated restrictions on
a probationer's right to travel,165 freedom of speech and associa-
"I For a discussion of prisoners' constitutional rights to procreation and privacy, see
supra notes 139-54 and accompanying text.
16 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) ("State properly subjects proba-
tioner to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens."); People v. Ison, 346 N.W.2d
894, 896 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) ("[C]riminal conviction constitutionally deprives the de-
fendant of much of his liberty, convicts retain some constitutional rights, but those
rights are subject to restrictions imposed by nature of the regime to which they have
been lawfully committed."); Gilliam v. Los Angeles Mun. Court, 159 Cal. Rptr. 74, 77
(Ct. App. 1979) ("A condition of probation which requires a defendant to give up a con-
stitutional right is not per se unconstitutional").
See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
Ison, 346 N.W.2d 894.
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tion,166  and freedom from warrantless searches.1 6 7  Courts
throughout the country, both state and federal, vary widely in
the extent to which they will allow abridgements of constitu-
tional rights of probationers. For the most part, however, be-
cause of probationers' diminished rights, constitutional chal-
lenges to probation conditions often fail.
16 8
Traditionally, the restrictions on probationers' constitu-
tional rights have rested on three theories: "constructive cus-
tody," "explicit waiver" and "act of grace." Although commonly
used to justify limitations on probationers' Fourth and First
Amendment rights, examination of these theories will also help
to illustrate why the imposition of compulsory contraception is
an unreasonable burden on a woman's right to reproductive
autonomy.16
9
a. Constructive Custody
The "constructive custody" theory is premised on the legal
fiction that probationers, while not actually physically confined,
are technically still within the custody of the penal system and
therefore can be subject to the same restrictions as an incarcer-
ated criminal.1170 A California court in People v. Hernandez,
for example, used this theory to uphold a warrantless search of a
166 Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1124 (1975) (prohibiting membership in lawful social and political organization); State v.
Means, 257 N.W.2d 595 (S.D. 1977) (same). See also Commonwealth v. Kuhn, 475 A.2d
103 (Pa. Super. 1984). In Kuhn the defendant was sentenced to 15 years of probation for
robbery and was ordered as a condition of probation to attend church regularly. The
defendant did not appeal this condition, although the court of appeals addressed a warn-
ing to the lower courts that such a condition might, if challenged, be found to violate the
First Amendment.
17 State v. Gawron, 736 P.2d 1295 (Idaho 1987); State v. Lingle, 308 N.W.2d 531
(Neb. 1981). This condition is one of the more controversial. Although some courts have
upheld it, a number of others have found that it violates the Fourth Amendment guaran-
tee of protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures." See U.S. v. Consuelo-
Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975), see supra note 57; Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d
905 (Fla. 1979).
16 See Tavill, supra note 43, at 624.
269 For a concise study of restrictions on probationers' Fourth Amendment rights,
see Sunny A.M. Koshy, Note, The Right of [All] the People to be Secure: Extending
Fundamental Fourth Amendment Rights to Probationers and Parolees, 39 HASTINGS
L.J. 449 (1988).
1" Thus, some courts have justified prohibiting probationers from joining lawful po-
litical and social groups. See supra note 166.
171 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965).
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probationer by a parole officer, even though the officer had no
probable cause. As illustrated previously, these limitations have
included, although not explicitly, the right to procreate, since
confinement may effectively curtail an individual's ability to
conceive a child and the right to refuse medical treatment. Since
the very nature of prison is such that an inmate has no privacy
in his or her jail cell, it is argued, a probationer can have no
expectation of privacy or bodily integrity even within her own
home. However, assuming that the state may have legitimate in-
terests in restricting prisoners' reproductive rights and rights to
refuse medical treatment, these interests do not apply to proba-
tioners. Prisoners are not deprived of these rights merely be-
cause they are in custody, but rather because the nature of that
custody-the preservation of the prison as an institu-
tion-requires such restrictions. In a probation situation, the
compelling interests of prison security and order are not present,
nor would the imposition of compulsory contraception satisfy
any legitimate penological goals. 17 2 Thus, the need to supervise
probationers does not justify stripping them of rights even incar-
cerated individuals are held to possess absent compelling insti-
tutional needs. 7
b. Explicit Waiver
The "explicit waiver" theory is based on the notion that an
individual may waive constitutional rights, as probationers often
1' Ironically, such a condition could even work to the contrary of penological and
societal goals. Probation carries with it the assumption that breach of any condition will
result in incarceration. Thus, any woman who does not adhere to her probation condition
not to conceive, either accidentally or otherwise, may well end up pregnant in prison. In
fact, People v. Dominquez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1967), the seminal case on proba-
tion conditions, came before the California Court of Appeals because the defendant was
imprisoned when she became pregnant despite her use of birth control. This situation
not only implicates compulsory contraception as a condition of probation, but also car-
ries grave due process concerns. The alternatives are no better, a woman who gets preg-
nant on probation may try to hide her pregnancy, in which case she will most likely not
receive necessary prenatal health care, or she will be forced to obtain an abortion.
Clearly, the condition of compulsory contraception is not only difficult to enforce, but
may also work unintended damage.
273 See People v. Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184, 187 (CL App. 1978) ("As a matter of
constitutional principle, the scope of constitutionally permissible invasion of a prisoner's
Fourth Amendment rights is not coterminous with those that may be taken from a pro-
bationer."). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (a parolee's [or proba-
tioner's] "condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison").
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do when they agree to search conditions. 17 4 The assumption is
that such a waiver is voluntarily made with a full understanding
of the circumstances.17 5 However, the "waiver theory" does not
apply comfortably to probation conditions.
First, it is doubtful whether the probationer is really mak-
ing the decision to accept the conditions of probation freely. The
court in People v. Keller17 6 stated:
The "waiver" theory presumes consent. However, it is a "hypotheti-
cal" or a "nominal" rather than a real consent. The overhanging
Damoclean sword of imprisonment prevents a true consent. The
"Waiver" concept also fails to take into account the duty, the author-
ity, nondelegable, of the trial court to imprison or grant probation on
lawful terms. That power does not, cannot, rest on either real or nomi-
nal "waiver" or "consent" by the to-be-sentenced defendant. 177
The line between competent decisionmaking and state coercion
is an exceedingly thin one. Care must be taken to ensure that
individuals like Darlene Johnson are not railroaded, with no ju-
dicial recourse, into excessive, albeit "voluntary," infringements
of constitutional rights.
Second, consent itself is a farce unless it is founded on a
well-informed understanding of all that is involved in a particu-
lar condition of probation. This is especially true where, as in
the case of Norplant, the condition poses known and unknown
risks to a probationer's health and welfare. 178 In fact, Darlene
11" See Keller, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
"1 See In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Ct. App. 1971).
176 143 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Ct. App. 1978).
177 Id. at 188 n.2.
178 A similar issue has arisen in the context of whether sex offenders may be re-
quired to undergo medical treatment as part of their sentence, probation or parole. The
Upjohn Company has developed the drug medroxyprogesterone acetate ("MPA"), a hor-
mone that diminishes the compulsive sex drive of a class of offenders known as
paraphiliacs. This MPA treatment, which has been termed "chemical castration," has
elicited a great deal of controversy amongst legal and medical scholars. Much of the
debate, as with compulsory contraception, has focused on the unknown health risks asso-
ciated with such a condition, and the questionable validity and constitutionality of the
treatment as a condition of probation. See People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1984) (holding that MPA treatment as a condition of probation for man con-
victed of statutory rape was unlawful and invalid due to the experimental nature of the
drug and practical problems); see also William Green, Depo-Privera, Castration, and the
Probation of Rape Offenders: Statutory and Constitutional Issues, 12 U. DAYRON L. REV.
1, 13 (1986).
Advocates and opponents of chemical castration have also focused on the issue of
informed consent. See supra note 126. Courts have recognized the grave risk of coercion
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Johnson had never heard of the procedure before and Judge
Broadman knew only about the general nature of the device. He
did not, for example, know that Norplant is contraindicated for
women with certain diseases. Nor did the judge know that Ms.
Johnson suffered from diabetes and may have been put at great
risk by implantation of the drug."1e
Finally, there can be no waiver of a constitutional right or
consent to a condition that is, in and of itself, detrimental to
society. As the Dominguez court wrote:
Appellant did not waive the right to urge the invalidity of the condi-
tion of probation [prohibiting her from becoming pregnant] by ac-
cepting the benefit of probation. "We are not dealing with a right or
privilege conferred by law upon the litigant for his sole personal bene-
fit. We are concerned with a principle of fundamental public policy.
The law cannot suffer the state's interest and concern in the obser-
vance and enforcement of this policy to be thwarted through the guise
of waiver of a personal right by an individual."18'
Thus, rights cannot be waived for a condition that is in and
of itself void as against public policy. State-imposed contracep-
tion, which carries with it the dangers of social engineering, em-
bodies such a condition.
c. Act of Grace (or "Implied Consent")
The "act of grace" rationale assumes that probation, in lieu
of incarceration, is a privilege, rather than a right, which the of-
fender is free to turn down if she or he feels that the terms im-
involved, for example, in inmate participation in drug experimentation programs,
Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 1 ME rAL Dzmry L, REP. 147, 150
(1976), while others have supported the right of incarcerated individuals to consent to
medical experimentation, Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1979). Currently 12
states and the District of Columbia have statutes allowing for MPA treatment of con-
victed sexual psychopaths. See Joseph F. Grahowsld V, Comment, The Illinois Sexually
Dangerous Person Act: An Examination of a Statute in Need of Change, 12 S. ILL. U. L.
J. 437 (1988). For an argument supporting the use of MPA treatment, see Edward A.
Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the Sexual Offender, 18 Am J.
CRns L. 1 (1990).
179 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 9-11.
11* 64 Cal. Rptr. at 294 (quoting People v. Blakeman, 339 P.2d 202, 203 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1959)); see supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. See also State v. Braxton,
326 S.E.2d 410, 411-12 (S.C. 1985) (holding void as against public policy a condition of
probation and suspended sentence requiring defendants convicted of first-degree crimi-
nal sexual conduct to submit to castration).
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
posed are too harsh.181 It has been suggested that by accepting
this privilege, probationers lose the power to question the fair-
ness, validity or constitutionality of these terms. 182 However,
both the state's power to grant probation and its discretion to
impose conditions are limited by statutory and constitutional re-
strictions. Although probation might be viewed as an "act of
grace" or a privilege, this does not mean that courts are free to
bootstrap unconstitutional conditions without independent
justifications.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMPULSORY CONTRACEPTION AS
A CONDITION OF PROBATION
As discussed, higher courts thus far have generally taken a
dim view of compulsory contraception because it bears an insuf-
ficient relationship to both the crime of child abuse and the de-
terrence of it.183 The Pointer decision, however, makes it clear
that the reasonable relationship standard is a malleable one.
Thus, it is uncertain whether future courts will determine that
compulsory contraception meets the reasonable relationship
standard of People v. Dominguez. s4 Even if the compulsory im-
plantation of Norplant were found to be within the statutory
boundaries of valid probation conditions, however, it cannot be
upheld as a valid condition of probation because it constitutes
an unreasonable infringement of an individual's constitutional
rights to privacy, procreation and bodily integrity.1 85
The court in United States v. Pastore" 6 held that "un-
usual" conditions of probation necessitate heightened constitu-
tional scrutiny.187 The nature and novelty of the drug Norplant,
with its uncertain health risks, creates such an "unusual" condi-
tion. Heightened scrutiny is also appropriate because of the po-
tential for governmental abuse that Norplant presents; it is es-
181 See In re Mannino, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880, 882 (Ct. App. 1971).
282 Id.
183 See supra notes 13 & 77 and accompanying text.
184 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Ct. App. 1967). See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct.
App. 1984); see also supra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
'8 But see Arthur, supra note 18 (arguing that birth control as a condition of pro-
bation does not infringe the constitutional right to privacy but may violate procedural
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
186 537 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1976).
187 Id. at 681; see supra note 102.
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sential that courts pay particularly close attention to the
constitutional issues raised by this condition of probation to en-
sure that fundamental rights are not trampled in the state's de-
sire to address the tragedy of child abuse. Applying the White
test for the constitutionality of probation conditions to compul-
sory contraception, it becomes evident that the status of proba-
tioner does not justify the government's infringement of these
constitutional rights.
First, as mentioned, the condition of compulsory contracep-
tion does not "reasonably relate to the intended purpose of the
legislation conferring the benefit." The primary objective of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act and of state probation stat-
utes is that of rehabilitation. There is nothing to indicate that
implanting a hormonal contraceptive in a woman would rehabili-
tate her.188 Rather, such an action is so excessive and irrational
as to be merely punitive and thus infringes unreasonably on the
probationer's constitutional rights.
Second, the impairment of fundamental rights created by
this condition vastly outweighs the benefit to the public. As dis-
cussed, compulsory contraception by means of Norplant vdll not
sufficiently address or solve the problem of child abuse.189 In-
stead, it impinges significantly on the constitutional rights of
privacy and bodily integrity and opens the door to state-coerced
contraception of the Buck v. Bell variety.1 0 An ordered, civilized
society that honors individual liberty cannot tolerate such a sys-
tem. To allow the government to make decisions about who may
or may not bear children can lead only to frightening abuses of
power and societal control.191
Third, a condition of compulsory contraception is unreason-
ably overbroad and therefore does not justify the constitutional
infringement. As the White court noted, prohibiting the defend-
ant from entering a certain area of the city where prostitution is
prevalent will not deter future solicitation-the defendant could
simply solicit elsewhere.1 9 2 Furthermore, the condition is over-
i See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 11, 25 & 77-78 and accompanying text.
1'o 274 U.S. 200 (1927); see supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
191 One must not forget that our society allegedly decries the methods used by
Hitler in Nazi Germany to eliminate "undesirables" and coercive measures of population
control in China.
"1 158 Cal. Rptr. at 566; see supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
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broad because the probationer may be carrying on legitimate
business in the prohibited area. As such, the "condition in ques-
tion is so sweeping and punitive that it becomes unrelated to
rehabilitation." 193 People v. Pointer94 is illustrative of a simi-
larly overbroad condition.195 In invalidating compulsory contra-
ception, the Pointer court emphasized that the "salutory pur-
pose" of preventing injuries to future children "can adequately
be served by alternative restrictions less subversive of [the pro-
bationer's] fundamental right to procreate." 19 The court indi-
cated a number of less restrictive alternative conditions that
would be more effective in preventing future criminality and less
violative of the offender's rights. Examples of these alternatives
include parental counseling, substance abuse treatment, parent-
ing classes, vocational training and withdrawal of custody.9 7
Finally, the right to refuse medical treatment, like that of
reproductive freedom, applies not only to the general public, but
also to individuals convicted of crimes. 93 Norplant is a surgical
procedure associated with a number of painful or debilitating
side effects. It is also highly dangerous to women with certain
ailments, such as high blood pressure and diabetes.199 Further-
more, as a newly approved drug, little is known about the long-
term effects on a user's health or future ability to conceive
healthy children.
By ordering a woman to have a chemical implanted into her
body, the court not only violates a woman's fundamental right to
decide whether and when to bear a child, but also takes away
any choice she may have to use other, less drastic and often
more suitable methods of birth control. Proponents of Norplant
as a condition of probation argue that the device is not forced
upon the probationer, but is offered as an alternative to incar-
ceration, and that the individual is free to make her own in-
formed choice. 00 As illustrated, however, serious doubts exist as
193 Id.
1 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984).
191 Id.; see supra notes 66-67, 85-93 & 109 and accompanying text.
' 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
197 Id.
198 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480
(1980); see supra notes 157-162 and accompanying text.
"I Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 6, at 5.
100 For a discussion of the "explicit waiver" and "implied consent" theories that
justify restricting the constitutional rights of people on probation, see supra notes 174-
1016 [Vol. 58: 979
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to whether one can really make an informed and voluntary deci-
sion when one is faced with the choice between prison and an
unknown danger. The Johnson case stands as testimony that the
Norplant probation condition involves great medical uncer-
tainty. Most clearly, the condition violates a woman's right to
make informed decisions about her own body without govern-
ment interference.
Many of the arguments addressing the unconstitutionality
of compulsory contraception as a condition of probation may not
satisfy those who contend that children's rights not to be abused
must prevail over the rights of those who might abuse them.20'
Indeed, the issue is not an easy one. The most adamant advocate
of reproductive freedom cannot fail to acknowledge that in par-
ticularly egregious circumstances some curtailment of this free-
dom may appear to be the only feasible solution for preventing
child abuse. Where fundamental rights are infringed, however,
courts have a responsibility to ensure that the conditions im-
posed are narrowly tailored to meet the objectives of probation.
An order of sterilization, temporary or otherwise, relates only su-
perficially to the crime of child abuse and cannot be justified
where less restrictive alternatives exist that would more directly
address the problem of child abuse. 2
Courts have available a number of such alternatives that are
less intrusive of constitutional rights. Parental counseling, which
teaches important parenting skills and helps alleviate stress, has
been shown to be an effective method of reducing child abuse.2 0 3
Vocational training can help the parent learn the skills needed
to ease economic pressures and gain self-esteem. Substance
abuse treatment, where necessary, can help eliminate a serious
contributing factor to child abuse. Finally, the children can be
withdrawn from custody until the parent is better able to cope
with the responsibilities of parenthood.
These alternatives are by no means perfect. Social services
180 and accompanying text.
201 See Bartrum, supra note 22, at 1037.
202 But see Arthur, supra note 18 (suggesting that while compulsory contraception
violates procedural due process, it may not violate the right to privacy for women already
convicted of child abuse).
203 Coyle, supra note 11, at 245; Michael S. Wald & Sophia Cohen, Preventing Child
Abuse-What Will It Take?, 20 FAL. L. Q. 281 (Summer 1986); Donnelly, supra note 25,
at 26.
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and foster care are expensive to society and child welfare agen-
cies responsible for recognizing and preventing child abuse are
highly fallible. 0 4 The answer, however, cannot lie in allowing the
government to disregard fundamental constitutional rights.
Rather, federal, state and local authorities must work to enhance
the financial and administrative resources for addressing the
problem of child abuse at its roots. There is little question that
child abuse most often arises in circumstances more tragic than
evil. Courts should and must focus more on these circumstances
themselves as a means to rehabilitate the offender and prevent
further abuse. To do otherwise is not only an unacceptable viola-
tion of constitutional and statutory proscription, but also a futile
attempt to solve a problem by ignoring its very causes.
CONCLUSION
Because the rights to reproductive freedom and bodily in-
tegrity are fundamental, they can be restricted only when the
court can show a compelling need to do so. Furthermore, the
state may not infringe upon these rights if alternatives exist that
are less violative of those constitutional protections. Although
the state has a legitimate interest in protecting present victims
of child abuse and preventing harm to future ones, the imposi-
tion of compulsory contraception as a condition of probation is
an unreasonable burden on an individual's constitutional rights
and is not narrowly tailored to meet the objectives of probation.
Even though the Supreme Court has upheld the rights of
incarcerated and convicted people to procreate and to make per-
'" Foster care was designed to provide a home for children temporarily unable to
live with their own parents because of abuse, neglect or parental incapacity. See Daniel
L. Skoler, A Constitutional Right to Safe Foster Care?-Time for the Supreme Court to
Pay Its I.O.U., 18 PEPP. L. REV. 353 (1991). A record number of children-almost
340,000-are currently in foster homes, costing state and federal governments almost $1
billion annually. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, No PLACE TO
CALL HOME: DISCARDED CHILDREN IN AMERICA, HR. REP. No. 395, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.
17-19, 123 (1990). The rapid growth in foster care needs over the past decade has been
characterized by- an increase in placements attributable to alcohol or drug use at home; a
disproportionately large number of minority children in foster care; a supply of foster
family homes that is inadequate to meet the demand; and a lack of resources in foster
care agencies to handle the growing caseload. Id. at 5-9. Some studies suggest that the
rate of abuse and neglect of children in foster homes is greater than that in the general
population. P. RYAN & E. MCFADDEN, NATIONAL FOSTER CARE EDUCATION PROJEC'.
PREVENTING ABUSE IN FAMILY FOSTER CARE 11 (1986). For a good discussion of the wel-
fare system's difficulty in coping with the burden of foster care, see Skoler, supra, at 353.
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sonal medical decisions, the remnants of the Eugenics movement
have not completely disappeared. With the advent of Norplant
has come a resurgence of this movement. Darlene Johnson's pro-
bation condition and recent proposals by political figures to
force women on welfare to have Norplant implanted indicate
that the government continues to participate in social engineer-
ing. Compulsory contraception for women on probation not only
violates the constitutional safeguards designed to protect a wo-
man's fundamental right to procreate, but also sets a dangerous
precedent of state-imposed contraception. As the Court wrote in
Skinner v. Oklahoma, °5 "[tihe power to sterilize, if exercised,
may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or
reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to
the dominant group to wither and disappear."200 The dangers
evident in 1942 are no less threatening now. The lessons we have
learned from the past must be applied to the present to ensure
that promising and important technology not be used in an un-
constitutional and unethical manner.
Janet F. Ginzberg
205 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
206 Id. at 541.
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